



































This paper examines the effect of weather shocks on violent crime using disaggre-
gated data from Brazilian municipalities over the period 1991-2015. I document
that adverse weather shocks in the form of droughts lead to a significant increase
in violent crime, with the effect appearing to persist beyond the growing season
and over the medium run. To explain this persistence, I show that weather fluctu-
ations are positively associated not only with agriculture yields, but also with the
overall economic activity. Moreover, evidence shows the dominance of opportunity
cost mechanism reflected in the fluctuations of the labor income especially for the
agriculture and unskilled workers, giving credence that it is indeed the labor income
that matters and not the general socio-economic conditions. Other factors such as
local government budget capacity, (un)-employment, poverty, inequality, and psy-
chological factors do not seem to explain violent crime rates.
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According to a United Nations report, the world is expected to brace more extreme
weather events with adverse effects falling disproportionately on developing countries
(IPCC, 2014). With more than half of the people in developing countries residing
in agro-rural communities, climate change poses a major threat to local agriculture
and agriculture-generated-incomes (FAO, 2018). This could in turn trigger intense
competition over scarce resources, which may eventually fold into widespread vio-
lence. Such context have spurred a growing body of literature trying to examine
the consequences of extreme weather events and climate change on civil conflict and
social unrest. While the bulk of this literature has focused on studying politically
induced conflict such as civil wars, riots and institutional breakdowns, little work
has been done to investigate non-political forms of social unrest such as criminal
activities. A few recent studies have documented a positive association between
crime rates and hot temperature and/or low precipitation. However, identifying the
mechanism driving such association has been debatable. Some emphasize the role
of income and economic motives (e.g. Blakeslee and Fishman, 2017), while others
cite non-economic factors such as weather-related depression, aggressive behavior or
changing habits (e.g. Ranson, 2014). Moreover, there has been little consensus on
the particular effect of weather conditions on violent crime.
To contribute to this debate, this paper makes use of variation of weather con-
ditions across Brazilian municipalities. The empirical strategy uses the within-
municipality variation in weather conditions to identify their effects on violent crime
(i.e. homicide rates) over the period 1991-2015.1 In contrast to the existing lit-
erature, which have extensively employed measures of temperature and rainfall, I
rely instead on Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) to con-
struct a weather indicator. The advantage of using SPEI index lies in the fact that
it jointly controls for the effects of rainfall and determinants of evapotranspiration
(i.e. temperature, wind speed, sunshine, soil, location), so that it can better cap-
ture exposure to water deficiencies. Besides, being a standardized measure allows
for quantifying deviations from the municipality’s long-run historical climate con-
ditions, and thus, for a better modelling of weather shocks. The strategy allows
for using temporal and spatial lags to take into account temporal correlations of
weather shocks and spatial correlation of crime rates.
I find two primary results. First, adverse weather shocks (i.e., drought) signifi-
cantly increases violent crime rates immediately and the effect persists beyond the
growing season and over the medium run. These persistent effects remain after
taking into account the spatial and temporal correlation of crime rates, and hold ro-
bust to a wide range of robustness tests. The estimates indicate that a one-standard
deviation decrease in annual SPEI below the municipality long-run mean increases
crime rates by 34% on impact and accumulatively by 70% over the medium run.
This is roughly 3% and 6% of the unconditional mean of violent crime rates. Sec-
ond, to explain this persistence, I show that economic factors represent the main
driving force behind the observed relationship. Weather fluctuations are found to
1Throughout the text, I use violent crime, crime and homicide rates interchangeably.
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be positively associated not only with agriculture yields, but also with the overall
economic activity in a persistent way. This is because they affect non-agriculture
sectors through affecting local demand. The latter effect is confirmed with evidence
showing the dominance of opportunity cost mechanism reflected in the fluctuations
in total earnings and wages particularly for the agriculture and unskilled labor, over
(un)-employment, local government capacity, poverty, inequality and psychological
factors.
As such, the analysis makes several contributions to the thin literature linking
extreme weather events to crime in general and violent crime in particular. First, I
show that weather shocks tend to have a persistent effect on both violent crime and
economic activity, in contrast to the conventional view perceiving weather effects as
transitory shocks (e.g. Brückner and Ciccone, 2011). Second, the findings provide
a first local evidence of the existence of spillovers effects between agriculture and
non-agriculture activities through affecting local demand. Third, it takes a broader
perspective and examines a wider range of underlying economic and non- economic
channels including agriculture yields, overall economic activity, labor market out-
comes, socio-economic levels and public services (i.e. education and police presence).
To the best my knowledge, this is the first attempt to quantify the effects of weather
fluctuations on a wide range of socio-economic variables and crime determinants at
a disaggregated level. Fourth, it shows that it is the labor income especially of the
agriculture and unskilled workers that matters and not the general socio-economic
conditions. This is because labor income determines the opportunity cost of time
allocation between legal and criminal activities and affect local demand. In addition,
agriculture and unskilled workers represent the hardest affected group, who are most
likely to commit crime. Fifth, I document that criminal activities in neighboring
municipalities can increase crime in the municipality itself reflecting a strong spatial
correlation in crime rates across neighboring municipalities.
The paper builds on previous studies reporting a positive association between
adverse weather conditions and crime due to economic factors (Melhum et al., 2006;
Miguel, 2005; Iyer and Topalova, 2014; Blakeslee and Fishman, 2017). However,
these studies have relied extensively on measures of temperature and precipita-
tion to constitute their weather variables, which -despite their popularity- do not
fully quantify the exposure to water deficiencies in an efficient way (Couttenier and
Soubeyran, 2014; Harari and La Ferrara, 2018).2 Methodologically, they do not take
into account the spatial dependency of crime activities, which I show that it explains
much of the municipal variation in crime rates. Without taking into account the
spatial correlation of crime, the resulted estimates would suffer from an upward bias
and hence, an overestimation of the effect of weather shocks on crime. Moreover,
their results were mixed regarding the effect of weather on violent crimes. The latter
has more to do with the difference in the studied context, for instance in countries
with relatively low crime rates or using a historical period of analysis (i.e. as in
case of Melhum et al. (2006) who use historical data from 19th century Germany).
Equally important is that their attempts to identify the channels through which
2Specifically, Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014) argue that drought cannot be represented as a
simple (linear) function of rainfall and temperature, because they fail to capture non-linearities
such as climate history and the ability of soil to retain water.
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weather shocks affected crime have been limited in scope and focused on a single
income measure (e.g. agriculture output and/or wages).
Another line of studies specifically looks at temperature-crime relationship and
finds that the relationship is particularly significant for violent crimes in Mexico and
USA highlighting the roles of weather-inflicting aggressive behavior and/or alcohol
consumption (Ranson, 2014; Baysan et al., 2018; Cohen and Gonzalez, 2018). Yet,
these studies have relied on high-frequency data (e.g. daily or monthly), which could
better discern the role of non-economic factors, especially given that these factors
tend to be less persistent over time (Jacob et al., 2007). Therefore, employing an-
nual data circumvents other confounding psychological or behavioral factors that
could potentially intervene with economic causes. Nevertheless, because the proxy
for violent crimes is homicides rates, which could be driven by either economic or
non-economic motives, I address the latter motives in two ways. First, I show that
homicide rates is negatively correlated with suicide rates – an indicator for deteri-
orating mental health. Second, I find that weather fluctuations leave no significant
effect on suicide rates.
The paper more generally fits the literature on income shocks and crime. Closely
related is the study by Dix-Carneiro et al. (2018) which considered the impact of
Brazilian trade liberalization policy during 1991 and 1995 on homicides dynamics.
They showed that micro regions exposed to larger tariff reductions experienced a
temporary increase in crime in the medium-run following liberalization. In contrast
to their study, I consider a more disaggregated level of data at the municipal level
and a type of local shock that is recurrent. Indeed, a particular feature of weather
shocks in Brazil is that they are recurrent events that unfold persisting effects that
could remain for longer periods (Dell et al., 2012), while trade liberalization is a
one-time event whose effects dissipates over the long run. Furthermore, their study
relied on the cross-section variation of regional exposure to tariff reduction over a
longer time span, whereas my empirical strategy exploits the within-municipality
annual variation in weather conditions. Another distinction lies in examining the
response of different labor groups, particularly the agriculture and unskilled labor,
and not only the general labor market conditions. Other studies have documented a
negative impact of welfare payments and conditional cash transfers on crime (Foley,
2011; Chioda et al., 2016) or a positive association between agriculture aphids and
crime (Bignon et al., 2017). Commodity price shocks were examined by Corvalan
and Pazzona (2019), who find that higher copper prices have reduced on property
crime in the short-run in the Chilean mining-municipalities.
The paper also contributes to two other strands of literature. The first is the
literature on climate and conflict (i.e. civil wars) using rainfall shocks (Miguel et
al., 2004; Ciccone, 2013; Miguel and Satyanath, 2011) or global events of climate
change (Burke et al., 2009; Hsiang et al., 2011) or alternative drought measures
(Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2014; Harari and La Ferrara, 2018). I share with the
latter two studies the use of SPEI to better model weather shocks. The second strand
of studies relating weather fluctuations to revolutions, insurgency and institutional
change (Jia, 2014; Dell, 2012; Brückner and Ciccone, 2011; Guardado, 2018).3 I
3See Hsiang et al. (2013) for a review of the literature on climate and conflict in its different
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relate to both strands by providing evidence that the income channel is main driver
for the observed relationship.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
of the Brazilian context and presents the conceptual framework. Section 3 discusses
the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 and 5 present the baseline results and
various robustness checks, respectively. Section 6 extends the analysis to identify
various mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Brazilian Context
Brazil is a world leading agriculture producer with exports of agriculture raw ma-
terials representing around 19% of its total exports and a total agribusiness of agri-
culture and food industries accounting for 35% of its exports in 2018 (WITS, 2020).
Major Brazil’s exports include sugarcane, coffee, corn and soybeans with the latter
representing 30% of world production. Agriculture in Brazil remains largely rain-fed
with agriculture-irrigated land representing around 1.6% of total agriculture land in
2006, which is very low compared to China and USA with irrigated land occupying
10.5% and 5.5% of total their agriculture land, respectively (World Bank, 2020).
Moreover, Brazilian agriculture depends extensively on manpower with 35% of total
workers employed in the agriculture sector according to 2010 census figures, 90% of
which are informally employed.
It follows that negative weather shocks in the form of high temperature and/or low
rainfall can represent a major strike to agriculture generated-revenues and earnings.
This was the recently evident during the period 2014-2017, in which the country has
witnessed the worst drought season in 100 years causing disruption in the production
of coffee beans and sugar, and downsizing of operations.5 There is also plenty of
evidence that negative rainfall shocks adversely affects income levels, employment
and agriculture production in Brazil (see, e.g., Kruger, 2007; Hidalgo et al., 2010).
Yet, drought remains a recurrent phenomenon in Brazil with episodes of dry
years have been occurring since mid-1990s (CEMADEN, 2020). Based on USAID
climate risk projections, Brazil is in high risk of experiencing an increase in annual
mean temperature over much of the Amazon area by 2085 coupled with a decline
in precipitation and prolonged drought season. This has caused extreme cycles
of drought to occur more frequently.6 Aside from its agriculture economy, Brazil
occupied the 8th place worldwide in intentional homicide rate and the 1st place in
absolute number of homicides, which exceeded 64,000 cases in 2017 according to the
forms plus a critique of the empirical methodologies.
4Other climate literature have examined the effects on agriculture profits (Deschenes and Green-
stone, 2007); on health and mortality (Deschenes and Moretti, 2009; Burgess et al., 2017; Maccini
and Jang, 2009); and on economic growth (Dell et al. 2012). See Dell et al. (2014) for an overview





United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. The homicide rate is considerably high
touching 30.8 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants compared to a world rate of only 6
homicides.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
The economic effect of weather shocks on crime rates can be gauged based on the
theoretical models developed by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) regarding crime
as an action taking place when the payoffs of criminal activities outweighs both the
returns from legal activities and the costs of committing crime. Closely related is
the Fajnzylber et al. (2002) economic framework of criminal behavior modeling it
as a function of the opportunity cost of crime and the probability of apprehension
and sanctions.
During drought seasons, the returns from labor-intensive agriculture activities
are expected to decline –due to the slump in earnings or profits following the low
agriculture yield- and thus, reducing the opportunity cost of committing crime (Dal
Bo and Dal Bo, 2011). However, altering the time allocation between legal pro-
ductive activities and crime, as suggested by the opportunity cost mechanism, can
occur through either (1) job layoffs and declined labor demand, and hence, low earn-
ings and freeing up time to engage in criminal activities, or (2) deteriorating labor
income even in the absence of job dismissals. Moreover, non-agriculture activities
are expected to be adversely affected through a decline in local demand causing a
further reduction in non-agriculture labor returns and/or demand (Dell et al., 2012).
In addition, the decline in labor income can exacerbate existing poverty levels and
income inequalities, and hence deepening the extent of socio-economic grievances.
The costs of crime in terms of the probability of getting arrested depends on
the ability of local governments to apprehend criminals and secure local property.
Negative weather shocks can adversely affect local municipal revenues forcing cuts
in the number of local police forces or security budgets, and in turn, increasing
incentives to engage in criminal activities when the probability of escaping justice is
higher (Corvalan and Pazzona, 2019; Bignon et al., 2015). An alternative channel
could be through the reduction in the provision of public schooling, and may affect
time allocated to illegal activities (Machin et al., 2011; Chioda et al., 2016). I refer
to these channels as local governments capacity.
Aside from economic motives, the propensity to commit violent crimes can be
traced back to emotional and psychological factors. Hot weather can affect human
behavior by influencing stress levels or social interactions, which could eventually
fold into physical aggression (Ranson, 2014). For instance, Baysan et al. (2018)
find that both homicides and suicide rates respond strongly to variation in monthly
temperature in Mexico. Alternatively, for the same country Cohen and Gonsalez
(2014) show that higher alcohol consumption and changing in time use during hot
weekends explains more weather-related crimes. A common feature of these studies
is that their results are based on daily or monthly data, which explains why non-
economic factors may appear to play a significant role in a narrow time window.7
7For instance, Jacob et al. (2007) show that crime rates exhibit negative serial correlation
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Overall, the driving force behind the impact of weather shocks on crime rates is
rendered a priori ambiguous. On one hand, the economic framework predicts that
favorable (adverse) weather conditions can decrease (increase) criminal activities
and this due to the increase (decline) in incomes generated from agriculture yields
and its spillovers on non-agriculture sectors. The effect can occur either directly
through influencing labor demand and/or income, or indirectly through municipal
budget. On the other hand, suggestive evidence show that higher temperature can
also increase crime due to psychological factors or changing habits. Nevertheless,
because the time span employed in this study is relatively longer relying on annual
variation in weather and crime rates, it is then expected to see a prevalence of income
channel over non-economic factors. This is because income changes requires more
time to be translated into violent crimes, while non-economic factors are more likely
to be reversed over the course of the year (Jacob et al., 2007).
3 Data and Empirical Approach
3.1 Data
The unit of analysis is the Brazilian municipalities defined by their 1991 boundaries
(i.e. beginning of the sample period). Given that the number of municipalities have
changed over time due to subsequent mergers and splits, the fixing of municipalities’
boundaries at a certain year ensures having a constant number of comparable areas
that existed throughout the sample period from 1991 to 2015.8 Because weather
shocks hit harder rural areas and crime dynamics can vary between rural and ur-
ban areas, I exclude big municipalities with average population exceeding 250,000
inhabitants or average population density exceeding 125 inhabitants per square km
over the sample period following convention.9 Predominantly urban municipalities
whose average share of rural population is less than 15 percent are also dropped.10
This allows for having more homogenous sample, with modes of production and in-
come generated activities are highly dependent on agriculture. This leaves us with
a balanced dataset of 3,848 municipalities.11
Violent crime data.—Municipality’s violent crime rate is measured by the number
of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in a given year and obtained from DATASUS
(Depatamento de Informatica do Sistema Unico de Saude), a dataset published by
the Ministry of Health.12 Homicides rates serve as a good proxy for violent crime
using weekly data from US counties. That rates of violent and property crime during weeks of hot
weather are offset by lower than usual crime rates in the following weeks, so that the cumulative
effect becomes insignificant.
8See for instance Blakeslee and Fishman (2014), Dube and Vargass (2013) and Caselli and
Michaels (2013) for similar methodology.
9Only 2 municipalities are dropped, namely: Ananindeua and São Lúıs.
10I follow Braga et al. (2016) criteria in classifying Brazilian municipalities into three categories
based on the share of rural population: predominantly urban (< 15%), intermediate rural (15 to
50%) and predominantly rural (> 50%).
11The results remain generally robust when these predominantly urban municipalities are re-
included as well as when the cut-off points for rural municipalities are modified (available upon
request).
12The same measure was used by Dix-Carneiro et al. (2018), and Ishak and Meon (2019) in
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rates given that lack of data on other forms of violent crimes for the same time period
for all municipalities. One important advantage of using homicides rates is that they
suffer less from under-reporting, which a typical feature of less violent crimes such as
theft or of crimes with social stigma (i.e. rape), especially in rural underdeveloped
areas (Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Gould et al., 2002). To check whether homicides is
indeed a reflective of the violent crime rates, I rely on municipal level data on armed
robberies and physical assault disclosed by the states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais
from 2001 and 2013. Unfortunately, using this data is not suitable in my context
because these two states are highly urbanized, with urban population representing,
on average, 84% and 70% of their population, respectively. Hence, they do not
constitute an appropriate setting for testing the effects of weather shocks, which
should hit harder the agro local economies. Nevertheless, Table A2 in Appendix A
shows a high correlation between both homicides and robberies rates, and homicides
and physical assault rates. The correlation gets stronger when both measures are
net of population, municipal and state year-fixed effects. Moreover, using cross-
section data from 2009 National Household Survey (PNAD) on victimization rates
in Brazilian states, I find a strong correlation at the state level between homicide
rates and 3 types of crimes: theft and armed robbery, attempted theft and armed
robbery and physical assault (Table 7 in Appendix A).13 In both cases, the homicide
rates exhibit a stronger correlation with armed robberies rates than with physical
assault pointing more to the economic intentions of committing those crimes.14
Weather data.—I rely on Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index
(SPEI) taken from Vicente-Serrano et al. (2010) to construct the weather indicator.
The SPEI dataset is a global grid divided into subnational cells of 0.5 × 0.5 degrees
latitude and longitude (approximately 55 × 55 kilometers). These grid cells are
then matched to the municipalities based on the latter’s centroids.15 The SPEI is
available on monthly basis and expressed in units of standard deviation from the
grid cell’s historical average (in this case from 1901 to 2015). The annual SPEI is
calculated by taking the 12-months average with higher values of this index corre-
sponding to favorable weather conditions (i.e. extensive rainfall) and lower values
indicating drought tendencies. The index was previously employed by Harari and
La Ferrara (2017) and Von Uexkull et al. (2016) in studying the effect of weather
shocks on civil conflicts in Africa. The advantage of using SPEI index lies in the
fact that it jointly controls for the effects of rainfall and determinants of evapotran-
spiration (i.e. temperature, wind speed, sunshine) making it more favorable over
estimating the impact of trade shocks and oil revenues on crime rates, respectively. I follow their
approach and add zero to municipality-year observations with missing data to avoid sample selec-
tion bias. Results remain also robust without making these additions (see Table B2 in Appendix
B).
13One advantage of the victimization surveys is that they suffer less from measurement errors, a
common and allows for a better measurement of actual crime rate. The PNAD survey is carried out
by Brazilian national bureau of statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat́ıstica-IBGE).
14As shown by Dix-Carneiro et al. (2018), homicides rates also exhibit a strong correlation at
the micro regional level with armed robberies. This is because violence is rendered a typical way
of settling disputes in Brazil, which involves the use of firearms and might end up in the murder
of one of the dispute sides.
15Shah and Steinberg (2017) and Iyer and Topalova (2014) for similar methodology.
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conventional measures of weather shocks such temperature and precipitation.16 To
further investigates the presence of non-linear effects for weather fluctuations, Ap-
pendix C contains the results of estimating a non-parametric model with different
intensity bins for SPEI to capture seasons of drought (i.e. negative weather shocks)
and excessive rainfall (i.e. positive weather shocks).
Other controls.—Data on annual municipality population is obtained from inter-
census population estimates provided by the Brazilian national bureau of statistics
(Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat́ıstica-IBGE). Geographical variables de-
scribing the location of municipalities (e.g. longitude, latitude and area. . . etc.)
are taken from Instituto de Investigación Económica Aplicada (IPEA). Other data
used in measuring driving channels (e.g. agriculture yields, economic activity, labor
market outcomes...etc.) and describing municipality characteristics are explained
in details in Appendix A. All data are firstly obtained at the 2016 municipal ad-
ministrative level, then aggregated to the municipal original 1991 boundaries. The
choice of the sample period is restricted by the availability of population data from
1991 onwards, which is necessary factor to control for in all specifications. Although,
population figures are also available for year 1980, which makes it possible to extend
the sample period using linear interpolation. I approach this issue as conservatively
as possible, maintaining the baseline period to 1991-2015, but using the alternative
extended sample 1980-2015 as a robustness check (see section 5).
3.2 Empirical Approach
The empirical specification seeks to gauge the effect of weather shocks on violent
crime rate. The identification strategy exploits the within-municipality variation
in weather conditions taking into account the spatial distribution of violent crime
rates. Formally, I estimate the following equation:
V iolentCrimeist = α1SPEIist + α2SPEIist−1 + α3SPEIist−2 + βXist
+ρWV iolentCrimeist + δi + γs × ηt + εist (1)
Where V iolentCrimeist is the homicide rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) in municipal-
ity i in state s and year t; δi is municipality fixed effects; γs × ηt is state-year fixed
effects; Xist controls for population density and εist is the error term. Municipality
fixed effects control for the differences across municipalities that are constant over
time, while state-year fixed effects control for common shocks occurring to the mu-
nicipalities belonging to the same state. The weather indicator SPEIist is included
at times t, t− 1, and t− 2. Hence, the corresponding coefficients
∑3
k=1 αk capture
the contemporaneous and lagged effects of weather variations on violent crime rates
(e.g. Mehlum et al., 2006). The inclusion of lagged terms has two advantages. First,
it allows for taking into account the correlation of weather variations discerning the
possibility of displacement of effects over time, and better estimating the impact of
contemporaneous shocks. Second, it makes it possible to identify the persistence of
effects over the course period. If the weather effects were persistent, the contempo-
16Refer to Harari and La Ferrara (2017) for more technical information on the construction of
the index.
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raneous and lagged coefficients would not sum up to zero. I control for population
density to capture scale effects taking into account that dense areas are more likely
to experience more violent crime.17
To further investigate the persistence and serial correlation of weather variations,
tables A4 and A5 in Appendix A perform formal checks of the time series properties
of weather shocks in Brazil. The formal tests presented in table A4 fail to reject the
null hypothesis of an absence of a unit root for the time series of SPEI in levels, but
rejects it for its first difference providing a first local evidence of the persistence of
these shocks. Table A5 contains tests of serial correlation, which universally reject
the null hypothesis of no-serial autocorrelation across years. Hence, both tests justify
the inclusion of temporal lags.
Spatial dependence.—Because violent crime rates tend to spatially clustered as
appeared in Figure 2, I include in equation 1 the spatial lag of violent crime rate,
WV iolent Crimeist, where W is a spatial contiguity weight matrix that defines the
potential interactions between each pair of municipalities. Two municipalities are
considered to be neighbors, if they lie within a 230 km distance cutoff. The cutoff
distance corresponds to the internal median distance within the federal state. A con-
tiguous municipality is then assigned a weight of 1, while non-neighbors located be-
yond 230 km distance are assigned a weight of zero. Accordingly, WV iolentCrimeist
is the average homicide rate in municipality i’s neighbors in state s at time t and
parameter ρ reflects the strength of spatial dependence in homicide rates. Fur-
thermore, I employ a spatial HAC correction for standard errors allowing for both
cross-section spatial correlation and location-specific serial correlation within 230 km
radius following the method developed by Conley (1999) and Hsiang et al. (2011).18
Channels.—Next, I examine the economic and non-economic channels through
which weather fluctuations may affect crime and estimate two specifications of the
following form:
Yist = α1SPEIist + α2SPEIist−1 + α3SPEIist−2 + βXist + δi
+γs × ηt + εist (2)
Where Yist is one of the following outcomes: the agriculture yield per hectare, the
economic activity, and the suicide rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) as a proxy for
psychological disorders in municipality i in state s and year t. Agriculture yield
is measured by both the real value of main crop gross output (2010 prices) and
its quantity (ton/hectare). The rest of controls are similar to equation 1, except
for the exclusion of spatial lag of crime rate. In this specification, standard errors
17Population density experiences less variation over time. Over the whole-sample period, the
average change in population density has a median (mean) of 1.2 (1.9) units per square km. In
addition, the variation in population density is less likely to be explained by climate variations.
The R2 of a model regressing population density on SPEI, municipality fixed effects and state-year
fixed effects was 0 and the joint significance of the estimated SPEI coefficients was only significant
at the 10% significance level (p-value = 0.09). Results remain robust if population density enters
at t-1.
18Results remain robust to clustering at the micro region level, which is a grouping of econom-
ically integrated contiguous municipalities with similar geographic and productive characteristics
(see Table B1 in Appendix B). Changing the distance cut-off for clustering standards errors leaves
the main results unchanged (see Table B3 in Appendix B).
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are clustered at the micro level, the next higher administrative level, to take into
account the spatial correlation in outcomes across neighboring municipalities.
For other channels, the data is only available for the years 1991, 2000 and 2010.
Therefore, I employ the below specification following Michael (2011):
Yist = α1SPEIist + +α2SPEIist−1 + α3SPEIist−2 + βXist + φist
+γs × ηt + εist (3)
Where Yist is the channel of interest (i.e. earnings, unemployment, state bud-
get...etc.) in municipality i in state s and year t and γs × ηt is state-year fixed
effects. Given the short time dimension covering only three points of time (1991,
2000 & 2010), I excluded municipality fixed effects. Instead, I control instead for
longitude, latitude, distance to federal state, distance to capital state, and dummies
for capital state, rural and coast municipalities (φis) and allow these control to be
time-varying by multiplying them with a linear time trend (t). Standard errors are
clustered at the micro level.
Including state-year fixed effects is essential given the Brazilian context, where
part of municipality’s revenues is received from the federal state (known as state
funds), which in turn are received from Brazilian national government. These fixed
effects capture shocks affecting federal state’s revenues, so that the main effect on
municipal budget revenues is only due to weather shocks. In this specification, stan-
dard errors are clustered at the micro level, the next higher administrative level,
to take into account the spatial correlation in outcomes across neighboring munic-
ipalities. As the same independent variable, annual SPEI, is used consequently in
multiple regressions with short time dimension, this can lead to a problem of incor-
rectly over-rejecting the null hypothesis in each test. To tackle that, I also report the
family-wise error rate (FEWR) following methodology developed by Romano and
Wolf (2005a; 2005b). The advantage of this methodology is that it uses step-wise
approach to take into account the probability of committing of Type I error in the
family of hypotheses.
4 Baseline Results
4.1 A First Look at the Data
The final sample consists of 3,848 municipalities over the period 1991-2015. Only 28
municipalities report no crime data over the entire sample period. Table 1 displays
some descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the analysis. The annual
SPEI reports an average of 0.10 reflecting a slightly favorable weather conditions
relative to the grid cell’s historical average.
To get a first snap shot of the relationship between weather fluctuations and
violent crime rate, Figure 1 plots the whole-period average SPEI against average
crime rate net of municipal and state-year fixed effects. The solid represents the
linear fit and has a slope of -5.61 (with a p-value of 0.00) indicating a negative
association between municipality’s rate of violent crime and weather conditions. The
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Notes: The graph shows the relationship between annual averaged violent crime rate and SPEI
net of municipal and state-year fixed effects. The solid line represent the linear fit, while the
dashed line represents the nonparametric local polynomial fit computed using an Epanechnikov
kernel.
Figure 1: Violent crime rate and SPEI – Correlation
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Homicide rate (per 100,000) 96,200 12.12 15.59 0 268.91
SPEI (whole-year average) 96,200 0.10 0.59 -2.16 2.16
Population density 96,200 43.11 70.16 0.06 3,293.93
plot shows that most of the observations are concentrated where negative values
of SPEI coincide with high violent crime rates. In other words, adverse weather
conditions (i.e. drought tendencies) are correlated with high violent crime rates,
while favorable weather conditions are associated with low violent crime rates. The
non-parametric dashed line is close to the linear fit suggesting that the relationship
is to a great extent linear, providing support for the use of SPEI levels as the main
measure of weather variations. Figure 2 depicts the spatial distribution of whole-
period average violent crime rate and SPEI. It shows a large degree of heterogeneity
in violent crime rates and weather conditions across municipalities. Violent crime
rates in the left plot seems to be spatially clustered, especially in mid-west regions
and along the coast. For comparison, the average SPEI in the right plot shows
coincidence with higher crime rates in municipalities with low SPEI.
4.2 Baseline Results
Table 2 reports the baseline results for estimating equation (1) using various defi-
nitions of the variables and model specifications. In all columns, the coefficient of
annual SPEI is contemporaneously negative and statistically significant at 1 or 5
percent significance level. Thus, a decrease in the level of SPEI, which corresponds
to lower rainfall or drought, significantly increases the violent crime rate on impact.
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Notes: The graph shows the spatial distribution of whole-period average violent crime rate and
SPEI
Figure 2: Violent crime rate and SPEI – Spatial distribution
In column 1, the contemporaneous annual SPEI is included along with its first and
second lags. We see that a higher SPEI has a negative effect on violent crime rate at
the same year and 2 years after. However, the coefficient of the second lag is lower
in magnitude and significance compared to the cotemporaneous effect. In column 2
and 3, I replace annual SPEI with the average SPEI during the municipality’s main
crop growing season and non-growing season.19 I do that to disentangle the effect of
within-year variations in weather conditions during and outside the municipality’s
main agriculture season. As argued by Blakeslee and Fishman (2017), the agriculture
season is the principal income source for the largest share of rural workers. Hence,
a weather-driven agriculture shock could affect the earnings of farmers and workers
in agricultural related activities in rural areas, and in turn affects the opportunity
cost of committing crimes.
Columns 2 and 3 show that both contemporaneous SPEI is statistically significant
during the growing season, but are insignificant outside the main crop’s growing
season. This suggests that the observed significant effects of annual SPEI on crime
is driven by weather changes occurring during the growing season in line with the
previous findings of Blakeslee and Fishman (2014) and Hirari and La Ferrara (2018).
However, the coefficients of SPEI in column 1 is greater in magnitude and significance
compared to that SPEI growing season in column 2. Column 4 runs a horse race test
by simultaneously including both annual and growing season SPEI. The coefficient of
the contemporaneous annual SPEI keeps its negative sign and statistical significant
at the 5 percent level, while the SPEI growing season become statistically significant.
If there were other unobservable factors that correlates with the effect of annual
SPEI on crime aside from weather variations during the growing season, then the
coefficient of SPEI during growing season should remain statistically significant.
Nevertheless, the results indicate that the effects of weather conditions during the
19See Appendix A for more details on the construction of these two variables.
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Table 2: Violent crime and weather
Dependent varibale: Homicide rate (per 100,000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SPEI, t -0.643*** -0.767** -0.399** -0.498** -0.395*** -0.313***
(0.222) (0.315) (0.199) (0.254) (0.138) (0.107)
SPEI, t-1 -0.210 -0.091 -0.155 -0.155 -0.002 -0.069
(0.198) (0.289) (0.179) (0.241) (0.140) (0.112)
SPEI, t-2 -0.467** -0.385 -0.257 -0.244 -0.225* -0.141
(0.184) (0.284) (0.165) (0.224) (0.132) (0.106)
SPEI Growing Season, t -0.341** 0.128
(0.164) (0.228)
SPEI Growing Season, t-1 -0.160 -0.121
(0.145) (0.209)
SPEI Growing Season, t-2 -0.340** -0.079
(0.142) (0.219)
SPEI Non-Growing Season, t -0.094
(0.131)
SPEI Non-Growing Season, t-1 0.036
(0.119)








W(Violent crime) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Sum of coefficients (SPEI) -1.320*** -1.241** -0.811** -0.897** -0.622** -0.523**
(0.381) (0.593) (0.353) (0.471) (0.259) (0.209)
Sum of coefficients (SPEI GS) -0.842*** -0.072
(0.274) (0.421)
Sum of coefficients (SPEI Non-GS) -0.059
(0.242)
Number of observations 96,200 96,200 96,200 96,200 96,200 96,200 96,200 96,200
Number of municipalities 3,848 3,848 3,848 3,848 3,848 3,848 3,848 3,848
Adjusted R-squared 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.156
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State ×Y earFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Year FE No No No No No No Yes Yes
State ×trend No No No No No No No Yes
The dependent variable is homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants as a proxy for total violent crime. W is a spatial
binary contiguity matrix that assigns 1 to municipalities lying within 230 km distance cutoff. The method of
estimation is ordinary least squares with Conley (1999) standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for spatial
correlation within 230 km radius. Significantly different from zero at *10% significance, **5% significance, ***1%
significance.
growing season on violent crime rates remain thereafter throughout the year and
it is not offset by variations occurring during the non-growing season suggesting
a persistence in the response of crime to weather variations within a given year.20
Furthermore, the annual SPEI embeds relatively less measurement error compared
to average SPEI during the growing season, which also carry the measurement error
of identifying the growing season. Assuming a classical measurement error, the
coefficients of SPEI growing season will be more downward biased owing to the
attenuation bias exacerbated by the inclusion of wide range of fixed effects.
Column 5 presents our main specification in equation (1) by adding the spatial
lag of violent crime rate to address spatial dependence. The estimated coefficient
of contemporaneous SPEI remains negative and significant, while the coefficient of
20The average growing season is 6.7 months, meaning that 56% of the annual weather fluctuations
occur during this period, which dominates, on average, any fluctuations taking place outside it.
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the spatial lag of crime is positive and significant. The latter suggests that ongoing
criminal activities in neighboring municipalities can increase crime in the munici-
pality itself reflecting a strong correlation in violent crime rates across neighboring
municipalities. Compared to column 1, the coefficient of SPEI is smaller in mag-
nitude (38% lower) indicating that neighboring crime can explain much variation
in municipality’s crime levels and its exclusion can overestimate the crime-weather
relationship. The total explanatory power of the model has also increased with
the inclusion of the spatial lag of violent crime rates.21 To put coefficients into
perspective, a one-standard deviation decrease in SPEI below the municipality’s
mean translates into an increase in violent crime rates by 34%, roughly representing
around 3% of the unconditional mean of dependent variable.22 The estimates are
consistent with previously reported estimated effects in the climate-crime literature.
For instance, Miguel (2005) estimate that a one standard deviation change in ex-
treme rainfall (drought or floods) led to an increase in the murder of witches by over
20% in Tanzania. More generally, the estimates lie within the distributed range of
estimated coefficients for the response of crime and conflict tendencies to climate
changes in the meta-analysis conducted by Hsiang et al. (2013). 23
In column 6, I introduce the spatial lags of SPEI to check whether weather fluctu-
ations occurring in neighboring municipalities can induce spillover effects on violent
crime rates in the municipality itself. The coefficients of the spatial lags enter small
and statistically insignificant indicating that effects of weather fluctuations within
a given municipality is strictly local and do not indirectly affect surrounding neigh-
bors. I will further investigate the presence of spillover effects in crime and weather
conditions by looking at higher administrative level data below in the robustness
checks. The last two columns deal with alternative sets of fixed effects. Column
7 re-estimates column 5 without the state-year fixed effects, but adds instead year
fixed effects, while column 8 additionally adds state-year specific trend. In both
cases, the coefficient of SPEI remains stable in sign and significance.
To further investigates the presence of non-linear effects for weather fluctuations,
Appendix C contains the results of estimating a non-parametric model with different
intensity bins for SPEI to capture seasons of drought and excessive rainfall. The
results show that that the effects are both quantitatively and qualitatively stronger
for adverse weather shocks (i.e. drought) corresponding to negative values of SPEI.
Hence, it confirms the previous finding in Figure 1 that the relationship between
weather shocks and violent crime rate is linear and further justify the use of level
SPEI to measure weather variations.
The bottom row of each column in Table 2 presents the cumulated effect of
weather fluctuations, calculated by summing the coefficients of SPEI variable and
its lags. In all specifications, the lags of annual SPEI do not sum up to zero, but
21The adjusted R-squared has increased from 2.6% in column 1 to 12.6% in column 5 (around a
350% jump). Note that the R-squared tend to be low because it is sensitive to the quantity of noise
in crime data. Hence, the importance of weather fluctuations in explaining violent crime rates will
appear to be smaller, even though the impact of weather variations is quantitatively large (Hsiang
et al., 2013)
22Note the standard deviation of within-SPEI is 0.861.
23In particular in Brazil and aside from climate literature, Dix-Carneiro et al. (2018) estimate
that a one standard deviation decrease in tariff led to an increase in violent crime rate run by 46%.
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remain significant, indicating the persistence of weather fluctuations not only beyond
the growing season, but also over the medium run confirming the formal results
from unit root testing. If weather effects are reversed over its course, for instance,
favorable weather conditions at one year will be followed adverse conditions in the
next year, then the cumulated effect of these variations should be summed to zero
or carry an opposite sign, which is not the case here. The accumulated effect of
a one-standard deviation decrease in SPEI below the municipality’s mean over the
medium run is a surge in violent crime rates by 70%, accounting for around 6% of
the unconditional mean of dependent variable.
5 Robustness Checks
IIn the previous section, I showed that unfavorable weather conditions have a per-
sistent positive effect on violent crime rates and the effect is driven by weather
fluctuations during the municipality’s agriculture season. In this section, I perform
a number of sensitivity checks to the baseline estimates in column 5 of 2. The results
are reported in Tables 3 and 4.
Municipal characteristics.—One potential concern is that the effect of weather
captures the role of unobserved time-varying municipality-specific factors. For in-
stance, the presence of a larger share of young and illiterate could lead to more
crime, while deploying more security forces can deter criminal activities (Angrist
and Kugler, 2008; Gould et al., 2002; Bignon et al., 2015). To deal with this con-
cern, I allow the effect of a number of initial municipality characteristics to change
over time by including an interaction between these characteristics and a year in-
dicator. The municipality characteristics enter at their 1991 level and include the
illiteracy rate, the share of young, male, unskilled and workers in public safety jobs
as well as the share of urban population. The results reported in column 1 of Table
3 show that the coefficient of SPEI remains stable in sign and significance.24
Weather can affect crime, if heavy rains caused roads to flood and reduced the
police ability to apprehend criminals or prevent crimes from taking place. To test
that, column 2 interacts weather conditions with an indicator of the presence of at
least one railroad station (in service) in a municipality in year 1995 as a proxy for
infrastructure (IPEA, 2019). The interaction terms enter positive suggesting that
favorable weather conditions can have less impact on crime in the presence of better
infrastructure that would facilitate the police movements, but they are statistically
insignificant and small in magnitude especially for the contemporaneous term.
Other local shocks.—So far, the estimation of the impact of weather conditions
on crime rates is applied in its reduced form holding constant other heterogeneous
factors that could be spuriously correlated with weather fluctuations and crime at
the municipal level. Still, one may want to check whether the presence of certain
municipality’s characteristics could exacerbate violent crime rates. Brazil is a world-
leading exporter of oil, which casts shadows on whether the presence of oil activities
24In unreported results, I also checked whether weather variations affect the composition of
young, unskilled and male-young-unskilled in the municipality and find no statistical significant
effect.
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Table 3: Violent crime and weather –Robustness checks
Dependent varibale: Homicide rate (per 100,000)












SPEI, t -0.406** -0.400** -0.398** -0.399** -0.363**
(0.194) (0.203) (0.199) (0.199) (0.185)
SPEI, t-1 -0.135 -0.160 -0.149 -0.151 -0.115
(0.178) (0.182) (0.179) (0.179) (0.168)
SPEI, t-2 -0.182 -0.303* -0.247 -0.249 -0.255*
(0.163) (0.168) (0.165) (0.165) (0.154)
SPEI × railroad stations, t 0.024
(0.225)
SPEI × railroad stations, t-1 0.008
(0.206)
SPEI × railroad stations, t-2 0.318
(0.218)
Oil revenues (log) (permenant) 0.571*
(0.303)
Oil revenues (log) (ever) 0.253*
(0.152)
Violent crime, t-1 0.149***
(0.009)
W(Violent crime) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000)
Sum of coefficients -0.692** -0.863 -0.793** -0.811** -0.733**
(0.350) (0.358) (0.353) (0.353) (0.312)
Number of observations 96,200 96,200 96,200 96,200 96,200
Number of municipalities 3,848 3,848 3,848 3,848 3,848
Adjusted R-squared 0.147 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.155
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls ×Y earFE Yes No No No No
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variable is homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants as a proxy for total violent crime. W is a
spatial binary contiguity matrix that assigns 1 to municipalities lying within 230 km distance cutoff. Controls
in column 1 includes the initial levels of share of the unskilled, male, young, illiterate, urban populatiion and
workers in public safety jobs. The method of estimation is ordinary least squares with Conley (1999) standard
errors reported in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within 230 km radius. Significantly different from
zero at *10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance.
can contribute to proliferation of crime. Ishak and Meon (2019) provide empirical
evidence that oil-abundant municipalities in Brazil suffer a proliferation of violent
crime rates. To consider that, I include a number of indicators for oil abundance
in Brazilian municipalities. Following Mamo et al. (2019), oil revenues for each
producing municipality are calculated by multiplying international oil prices (mea-
sured in 1991 US dollars) with municipality’s time-varying oil output.25 Thus, for
municipality-year observations with no reported oil output, this variable takes the
value of zero. Oil revenues are then expressed in its natural log plus 1 to avoid the
drop of municipalities with no oil production. In my sample, I have 102 municipali-
ties with at least one year of reported oil production. Of these municipalities, there
are 77 municipalities with active production activities taking place throughout the
sample period (i.e. permanent oil producers) and 25 municipalities with interrupted
production (i.e. temporarily oil producers).
The results are reported in Table 3. Column 3 adds oil revenues received only
by permanent oil producing municipalities as an additional explanatory variable
25See Appendix A for more details on the definitions and sources of oil variables.
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(i.e. revenues of temporarily oil producers are set to zero). This ensures to some
extent the exogeneity of oil production to disruption incidences occurring at the
municipality level that could be partly driven by pervasive criminal activities.26
Column 4 includes all oil revenues received by all municipalities with at least one
year of active oil production. Both variables captures the effect of the value of oil
production (or oil revenues) at the intensive margin. The oil variables enter positive
and statistically significant at the 10 percent level, whereas the coefficient of SPEI
remain remarkably stable in sign, magnitude and significance. This is not surprising
given that state-year fixed effects have already absorbed the heterogeneity captured
by these indicators.27 In the appendix, I alternatively consider dropping all oil
municipalities with at least one year of reported oil production and results remain
robust.
Dynamic Model.—Equation 1 is static and therefore does not take the inertia of
violent crime rates into account, with past levels of crime rates affecting current
rates. I therefore estimate a full spatially and temporally autoregressive model by
adding the lagged dependent variable to the explanatory variables. Column 5 shows
that the coefficient of SPEI slightly drops in size, but remains statistically significant
at the 5 percent significance level. The coefficient of lagged crime rates lights is
positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent significance level. Hence, the
long-run effect of one-standard deviation decrease in SPEI below the mean on crime
rates is 37%.
Falsification test.—In table 4, I address the concern that time-varying omitted
variables could be driving the estimated relationship between crime and weather
conditions. Indeed, it could be the case that the residual unobserved heterogeneity
still co-moves with weather fluctuations despite the wide array of fixed effects I in-
clude. To rule that possibility out, I follow two approaches. First, on the outcome
variable side, I randomly reshuffle violent crime rates across municipalities. Second,
I perform a placebo test by substituting SPEI with its past values for the period
from 1966 to 1990 before estimating equation 1 again. The estimated coefficients
of SPEI and its lags reported in column 1 carry opposite signs and are statistically
insignificant. In column 2, the coefficients of past values of SPEI behave inconsis-
tently and exert no statistical significant effect on violent crime rates. Moreover,
the sum of the estimated coefficients of shock variables is zero. In sum, as both
falsification tests have resulted in insignificant results, I can safely conclude that the
baseline results are not simply driven by co-movements in weather conditions and
violent crime rates.
Alternative sample and unit of analysis.—I next investigate whether sample size
can affect the baseline results. Column 3 of Table 4 extends the baseline sample
26Note the question of exogeneity of oil production in Brazil does not constitute a major issue in
these estimations, since most of the oil production is produced offshore with production decisions
are made by major international companies and not affected by factors occurring in a given mu-
nicipality (Caselli and Michaels, 2013). Furthermore, Brazil is not a member of OPEC and hence,
an oil price taker which makes international oil prices exogenous as well.
27In unreported results, I checked the results after dropping state-year fixed effects and including
instead year fixed effects. Indeed, I find that the coefficient of oil revenues (permanent) have
increased in magnitude and significance level (5% significance level), while SPEI remains negative
and significant (results available upon request).
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period over the years from 1980 to 2015. Recall, the baseline sample period was
restricted to 1991-2015 due to lack of data on population on annual basis before this
period. But, using population figures in 1980, I was able to interpolate between-
years figures from 1981 to 1990. I still find the coefficient of SPEI to be negative
and significant. The results of this sample should be taken with cautious since the
population figures used in this sample is crudely constructed, which could introduce
bias to the estimates.
Table 4: Violent crime and weather –Robustness checks
Dependent varibale: Homicide rate (per 100,000)










SPEI, t 0.187 0.153 -0.279** -0.371
(0.142) (0.128) (0.123) (0.305)
SPEI, t-1 -0.111 -0.051 -0.054 -0.088
(0.143) (0.122) (0.117) (0.276)
SPEI, t-2 0.010 0.088 -0.052 -0.215
(0.131) (0.123) (0.120) (0.280)
W(Violent crime) -0.0001 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.002)
Sum of coefficients -0.087 -0.189 -0.386* -0.675
(0.245) (0.218) (0.212) (0.657)
Number of observations 96,200 96,200 138,060 13,675
Number of municipalities 3,848 3,848 3,848 547
Adjusted R-squared 0.000 0.126 0.132 0.277
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variable is homicide rate per 100,000 inhibitants as a proxy fot total violent crime. W is a spatial
binary contiguity matrix that assigns 1 to municipalties lying within 230 km distance cutoff. The method of
estimation is ordinary least squares with Conley (1999) standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for
spatial correlation within 230 km radius in columns 1-3; and within 500 km radius in column 4. Significantly
different from zero at *10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance.
To further explore the spillover effects of crime rates and weather fluctuations,
I redefine the unit of observation to correspond to the next higher administrative
level. The idea here is that by doing so we define geographic units that internalize a
part of the spillover effects. The larger the administrative unit, the larger the share
of spillover effects that is internalized. I therefore conduct the analysis at the micro-
region level, which is a grouping of economically integrated contiguous municipalities
with similar geographic and productive characteristics, then at the level of macro-
regions, the next highest administrative level. Micro-regions closely parallel the
notion of local economies and have been widely used as the units of analysis in
the literature on effects of trade liberalization on local labor markets in Brazil (e.g.
Dix-Carneiro, Soares and Ulyssea, 2018). The average micro-region in our sample
comprises eight municipalities with a maximum number of 41 municipalities and an
average size of 15,000 square kilometers.
Column 4 of Table 4 contains the results. We see that that SPEI ceases to have
any significant effect on crime rates at the Micro-level. Recall, the findings in Table
2 signals the non-presence of spatial spillovers of SPEI on neighboring municipali-
ties. Hence, on the aggregate, the negative direct effect of weather fluctuations on
crime rates in a given municipality is offset by the non-existing neighboring effects,
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confirming the previous findings of the locality of the effects of weather conditions
confined to the boundaries of a given municipality. Similarly, the coefficient of spa-
tial lag of crime lost its significance, because spillover effects decrease with distance.
By construction of the spatial weight matrix, the more distant the added neighbors,
the less is the average neighborhood effects.
In general, throughout all the tables, the cumulated effect of weather fluctuations,
calculated by summing the coefficients of SPEI variable and its lags is negative
and statistically significant, except for the placebo tests. This again confirms the
persistence of weather effects over the medium run.
Other robustness checks.—Further robustness checks are discussed in detail in
Appendix B. These include: (i) estimating no lags model; (ii) adding more tempo-
ral lags for SPEI up to 10 lags; (iii) restrict the sample to 2000-2015 period; (iv)
exploring the long-run relationship; (v) a falsification test computed by replacing
the SPEI variable and its temporal lags with its one-year, two-year and three-year
forward SPEI; (vi) different distance cut-offs for computing standard errors and al-
ternative clustering at the micro level; (vi) dropping oil producing municipalities;
(vii) employing fixed-effects Poisson regression; (viii) dropping SPEI outliers of more
than 2 and 3 standard deviations; (ix) alternative measures for crime; (x) adding
rainfall and temperature measures; and (xi) adding squared SPEI. The main results
of these robustness checks can be summarized as follows. The baseline results re-
main robust in sign and significance with the dropping and the addition of temporal
lags, but the estimates become stronger when the sample is restricted to the 2000-
2015 period and when taking the long-run difference. The results of the falsification
test show that the estimated coefficients of forward SPEI are jointly statistically
insignificant. Increasing the distance cut-off of standard errors at 500 and 1000 km
distance or clustering at the micro level have reduced the statistical significance of
the weather SPEI variables echoing the results from the micro regions sample. Drop-
ping oil municipalities and SPEI outliers as well as employing fixed-effects Poisson
regression did not have an impact on contemporaneous effect of the SPEI. The same
is the case with using alternative measures of crime rates (e.g. unweighted crime,
dropping extreme values. . . etc.), adding squared SPEI terms or adding rainfall and
temperature measures. In Appendix C, I differentiate between the effects based on
the size and scope of agricultural activities in the municipality measured by the area
of cultivated main crop per capita and find the effects gets larger in magnitude the
bigger the cultivated area.
6 Channels
As discussed in the conceptual framework, the positive association between incomes
and weather conditions is expected to play a dominant role in the final impact on
crime relative to non-economic factors as predicted by opportunity cost mechanism
and local governments capacity. Moreover, the baseline results put forward that the
persistent effects of weather variations in violent crime rates is driven by weather
fluctuations during the agriculture season, which rules out the psychological motives.
Nevertheless, I analyze in this section these three potential mechanisms as previously
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identified in the literature to be most likely to affect violent crime.
6.1 Economic Factors
Given that variation in weather conditions are expected to affect incomes through its
impact on agricultural yields, I first examine the effect of SPEI on the municipality’s
main crop gross output. The main crop is defined as the crop with the largest share
of harvested area (measured in hectares) in the greatest number of years. Gross
output is measured in both real value and quantity per hectare.
Earnings and wages are the most widely documented to have the strongest effect
on crime (e.g. Gould et al., 2002; Dix-Carneiro et al., 2018; Corvalan and Pazzona,
2019). Pertaining to the agricultural context, where around 92% of agriculture work-
ers in Brazil are on average unskilled, I explore the evolution of these two variables
for both skilled and skilled workers. Unskilled workers are defined as fraction of
employed individuals with completed middle school or less and are older than 18
years old. Skilled workers are therefore the fraction of employed individuals with
secondary education or more. I also consider employment and unemployment ra-
tios as additional reflectors of labor market conditions (Raphael and Winter-Ember,
2001). These set of variables reflect the opportunity cost mechanism. Other socio-
economic determinants of crime include poverty and income inequality, which could
be a byproduct for detreating income levels (Iyer and Topalova, 2014; Fajnzylber
et al., 2002). I construct two measures for poverty. The head count ratio measur-
ing the fraction of households whose average monthly income below poverty line,
and the poverty gab, defined as the average distance of the poor household from
the poverty line to capture the depth of poverty. Income inequality is measured by
GINI coefficient based on household income per capita. Local governments capacity
is reflected in the changes in revenues and expenses of local governments, and the
degree of provision of public goods (Machin, 2011: Chioda et al., 2016). Hence, I
look at the effect on per capita municipal revenues and expenses, as well as average
years of schooling and public security as examples of public goods.28
The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 are estimated using equations 2 and
3.29All outcomes are expressed in logs to draw straightforward comparisons across
different outcome variables. Column 1 of Table 5 presents the results of the effect
of SPEI on the municipality’s main crop’s output value per hectare. It shows that
weather conditions have a positive association with agriculture yields and the effect
occurs immediately. The point estimates indicates that a one-standard deviation
decrease in contemporaneous SPEI leads to a decline in agriculture yield by 20% on
impact. The coefficients of the second and third lags of SPEI are also significant,
but negative in sign reflecting a reverse of the effect of the weather fluctuations.
In addition, the sum of SPEI coefficients suggest a less persistent effect of weather
conditions on agriculture yield. This not surprising given that output fluctuations
28Because municipal agriculture yields, expenditure and revenues are missing for some years in
some municipalities and in order to avoid selection bias, I add a zero to these missing values and
include a dummy variable capturing this transformation. However, the results remain qualitatively
similar without making these changes.
29Results remain robust if the outcomes are expressed in logs (available upon request).
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SPEI, t 23.271*** 0.148***
(6.591) (0.024)
SPEI, t-1 -33.377*** 0.101***
(12.154) (0.022)
SPEI, t-2 -58.188*** 0.109***
(14.768) (0.022)
Sum of coefficients -68.294** 0.358***
(27.506) (0.063)
Number of observations 96,200 84,304
Number of municipalities 3,848 3,848
Adjusted R-squared 0.314 0.581
Population density Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes
The method of estimation is ordinary least squares with robust standard errors reported in parentheses clustered
at the micro level. Significantly different from zero at *10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance.
can cumulatively cancel out each other indicating level effects. Hence, a decline
in agriculture yield following non-favorable weather conditions in one year, can be
compensated over the next years with the improvement in weather conditions, so
that the accumulative effect have a reversed sign.
To check whether weather conditions exhibit an effect on non-agriculture output,
I use mean night-time lights as a proxy for overall economic activity. The measure of
night-lights is provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s
(NOAA) National Geophysical Data Center for the period from 1992-2013. It comes
on a scale of 0-63, with higher values indicating more luminosity and has been used
as a proxy for GDP in recent studies (e.g. Ishak and Meon, 2020; Henderson et
al., 2012; Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014). The
results are reported in column 2 showing a positive and a persistent association be-
tween weather conditions and overall economic activity captured by light density at
the 1 percent significance level. A one-standard deviation decrease in SPEI below
the mean reduces the overall economic activity by 13% on impact and by 31% accu-
mulatively. This suggests that weather effects are not only confined to agriculture
output, but they can extend to other sectors consistent with the findings of Dell et
al. (2012) showing negative effects of temperature on industrial value added at the
country level. The persistence of the effects on overall economic activity confirms
the existence of spillovers between agriculture and non-agriculture sectors through
affecting the local demand.
Table 6 contains the results for other outcomes. The p-values conducted from the
family-wise error rate (FEWR) following methodology developed by Romano and
Wolf (2005a; 2005b) is reported in squared brackets and is used to assess statistical
significance. The tables also contains tests of equality between cross-model coeffi-
cients below each model. Columns 1-4 of panel A presents the results of the effect
of weather conditions on the total real earnings per worker, agriculture earnings,
earnings of skilled and non-skilled workers, respectively. Throughout the columns,
the results show that contemporaneous SPEI is positively associated with earnings
with the strongest effect, both in magnitude and significance, reported by earning
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Table 6: Economic factors (cont.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A Earnings Agr. Earnings Earnings Wages Agr. Wages Wages
Earnings skilled unskilled Wages skilled unskilled
SPEI, t 15.213*** 34.024*** 18.466 21.173*** 0.033 0.102** 0.068 0.073***
(7.514) (10.261) (13.879) (6.902) (0.039) (0.054) (0.079) (0.037)
[0.006] [0.001] [0.202] [0.001] [0.585] [0.011] [0.585] [0.001]
Test of equality (p-value) 0.00 0.72 0.03 0.03 0.55 0.01
Sum of coefficients 29.290*** 34.480** 28.203 30.581*** 0.099* 0.076 0.119 0.118**
(11.011) (14.552) (17.548) (10.326) (0.057) ( 0.073) (0.099) (0.54)
Number of observations 11,544 11,544 11,544 11,544 11,544 11,544 11,544 11,544
Number of municipalities 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848
Adjusted R-squared 0.821 0.641 0.622 0.795 0.804 0.615 0.557 0.760







SPEI, t -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
[0.114] [0.491] [0.691] [0.691] [0.114]
Test of equality (p-value) 0.91 0.37 0.12 0.14
Sum of coefficients 0.0001 -0.006 -0.002 0.002 -0.001
(0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Number of observations 11,544 11,544 11,544 11,544 11,544
Number of municipalities 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848
Adjusted R-squared 0.511 0.611 0.839 0.839 0.511
Panel C Poverty gab Inequality
SPEI, t -0.533 0.001
(0.369) (0.002)
[0.114] [0.897]
Test of equality (p-value) 0.14 0.98
Sum of coefficients 1.467** .006*
(0.670) (0.003)
Number of observations 11,544 11,544
Number of municipalities 3848 3848







SPEI, t 12.124 0.109 0.001 0.0001
(28.040) (25.073) (0.024) (0.0001)
[0.114] [0.691] [0.952] [0.242]
Sum of coefficients -21.667 -24.871 -0.011 0.0001
(32.394) (25.383) (0.033) (0.0001)
Number of observations 11,544 11,544 11,544 11,544
Number of municipalities 3848 3848 3848 3848
Adjusted R-squared 0.525 0.398 0.887 0.364
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State times Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged levels of SPEI are included, but not reported. Controls include longtitude, latitude, distance to capital
state, distance to federal state, coast dummy, rural dummy and capital state dummy. Tests of equality is relative
to log(earnings) and log(wages) in Panel A; to log(employment) in Panel B; and to log(poverty rate) in Panel C.
The method of estimation is ordinary least squares with robust standard errors reported in parentheses clustered
at the micro level. Significantly different from zero at *10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance.
of agriculture and unskilled workers. Similarly, columns 5-8 consider the impact on
total wages per worker, agriculture wages as well as wages of skilled and skilled work-
ers, which proxy the total demand on labor. We still observe a positive significant
impact of SPEI on the wages of agriculture and unskilled workers. Moreover, tests
of equality reject the null hypothesis of no statistical significance difference between
coefficients of agriculture earnings (wages) and coefficients of total earnings (wages).
The same is the case for unskilled earnings and wages. This is consistent with the
23
idea that the majority of agriculture workers being unskilled are the ones whose
incomes are hit the hardest following unfavorable weather conditions. Indeed, in my
sample 46% of employment is, on average, concentrated in the agriculture sector out
of which 92% are unskilled workers.
It also coincides with the previous findings of Machin and Meghir (2004) and
Gould et al. (2002) showing that property crimes respond more to declines in un-
skilled worker’s wages. Moreover, the fact that total earnings are affected reflects
the existence of spillovers between agriculture sector and other sectors in the munic-
ipality confirming the previous results on the positive association between weather
conditions and other non-agriculture output. The point estimates indicate that a
one-standard deviation decrease in contemporaneous SPEI below the mean leads to
a decline in total earnings and wages per worker by 13.7 and 2.8%, respectively. For
agriculture workers, the corresponding effect is 29.3% and 8.8%, respectively. For
unskilled workers, the effect on earning and wages is 18.3 and 6.3%, respectively.30
The corresponding estimates of the accumulative effects are statistically significant
and larger in magnitude relative to the immediate impact, except for agriculture
wages and earning. The latter echoes the previous findings of the reverse of the
weather effects on agriculture sector, and hence the impact on agriculture wages
tend to be less persistent.
Employment and unemployment rates do not appear not to respond immediately
to weather fluctuations as shown in Panel B, respectively. Similarly is the case
for agriculture, skilled and unskilled employment. One interpretation for this non-
immediate response could be due to the inability of agriculture workers, especially
the unskilled, to shift to other sectors immediately following a negative weather
shock. Hence, workers could in principle bear the fluctuations in their income in
exchange for not losing their jobs at least in the short run. Another possibility can
be that workers shift to low earnings jobs (e.g. in the informal economy) and in
this way their employment status will not change, but their earning and wages will
definitely drop.
Panels C and D contain the results of the effect on other non-labor market deter-
minants of crime. Panel C shows that the effect of SPEI is negative and insignificant
on poverty gab and inequality. Panel D documents positive, but insignificant impact
of weather conditions on municipal real revenues and expenses per capita. Similarly,
results show no significant effect on average years of schooling or public security em-
ployment rate, despite the fact that their point estimates are positive.
6.2 Non-Economic Factors
One could possibly test psychological motives for committing crimes by looking
at the effect of weather shocks on stress-induced behavior such as suicide rates
(per 100,000 inhabitants). Acts of suicide is a sign for mental health deterioration
due to stress or depression (Fazel et al., 2015). Committing crimes can go in line
with suicidal motives, such that a mentally unstable person can kill other people
30Due to the lack of annual data on earnings and wages, I am unable to estimate causal effects
on violent crime using weather conditions as an instrument and taking into account the overall
economic conditions.
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before taking his own life. If the latter were the case, one would expect to see a
positive correlation between crime and suicide rates. Alternatively, if weather were
the culprit for stress behavior, then one would expect an increase in suicidal rates
following adverse weather conditions.
Notes: The graph shows the relationship between annual averaged violent crime and suicide rates
net of municipal and state-year fixed effects. The solid line represent the linear fit, while the
dashed line represents the nonparametric local polynomial fit computed using an Epanechnikov
kernel.
Figure 3: Violent crime and Suicide rates – Correlation
Figure 3 depicts a negative correlation between violent crime and suicide rates,
in a sharp contrast to what would be expected if psychological factors drive criminal
motives. Table 7 contains the results on the effect of SPEI on suicide rates. Column
1 shows the effect of SPEI on suicide rates (per 100,000 inhabitants). Column 2
augments the specification in column 1 and add a series of initial municipal char-
acteristics interacted with year dummies as additional control variables. The initial
municipality characteristics enter at their 1991 level and include the illiteracy rate,
the share of young, male, unskilled and workers in public safety jobs as well as the
share of urban population. Throughout both columns, SPEI leave no statistical
significant impact on suicide rates. If anything the estimated coefficients point to
a positive association between favorable weather conditions and suicide rates. In
short, the above results indicate the psychological motives is less likely to represent
channel through which weather conditions affect crime.
In sum, weather shocks exhibits heterogeneous effects on labor markets variables.
Earning and wages are more affected, especially those of agriculture and unskilled
workers, compared to unemployment and employment rates in the immediate course.
Poverty, inequality, municipal budgets, public services and suicide rates are less
likely to respond to contemporaneous weather shocks. The results also indicate the
existence of spillovers between agriculture sector and other sectors reflected in the
total income generated, which goes directly to the workers pockets. Pertaining to the
conceptual framework, the analysis provides evidence of the dominant role played
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Table 7: Non-economic factors
(1) (2)
Suicide rate Suicide rate
SPEI, t 0.010 -0.028
(0.105) (0.106)
SPEI, t-1 0.138 0.141
(0.101) (0.103)
SPEI, t-2 -0.016 0.000
(0.091) (0.096)
Sum of coefficients 0.132 0.113
(0.171) (0.177)
Number of observations 96,200 96,200
Number of municipalities 3,848 3,848
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.030
Population density Yes Yes
Controls × Year FE No Yes
Muncipality FE Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes
The dependent variable in column 1 is suicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants. Controls include literacy. The
method of estimation is ordinary least squares with Conley (1999) standard errors reported in parentheses,
allowing for spatial correlation within 230 km radius. Significantly different from zero at *10% significance,
**5% significance, ***1% significance.
by economic factors over non-economic drivers of violent crime. It also shows a
stronger effect of opportunity cost mechanism relative to local governments capacity
and socio-economic variables in driving the impact on weather shocks on crime rates.
In addition, evidence shows that the opportunity cost alters the allocation of time
away from productive activities through fluctuation in labor income rather than
through labor demand and job layoffs.
7 Conclusion and General Discussion
This paper examines the link between weather shocks and violent crime using dis-
aggregated data from Brazilian municipalities over the period 1991-2015. In this
context, the paper contributes to the existing body of literature on the effects of
weather on crime. Previous studies have produced mixed results regarding the re-
sponse of violent crime and the analysis of the driving mechanisms. In light of the
little consensus on whether economic or non-economic motives drive the results,
the paper takes a first attempt to discern weather effects on a broader set of eco-
nomic and non-economic factors. Economic channels comprises not only agriculture
output, but also all forms of economic activity, labor market response, poverty,
inequality, local governments budget and public services.
Employing a measure of weather conditions that better captures exposure to
water deficiencies and allowing for the spatial correlation of violent crime rates, I
show that adverse weather shocks (i.e. drought) has a positive significant effect on
violent crime rates with the effect persisting beyond the growing season and over
the medium run. To explain this persistence, I provide evidence of the dominant
role played by economic factors in driving the observed relationship. I show that
unfavourable weather conditions are negatively associated not only with agriculture
yields, but also with the overall economic activity. However, weather variations
leave no significant effect on suicide rates. Moreover, focusing on economic fac-
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tors, evidence shows the dominance of opportunity cost mechanism reflected by the
fluctuations in total earnings and wages, especially for agriculture and unskilled la-
bor, over (un)-employment, local government budget capacity and socio-economic
conditions.
The results suggest that effects of weather fluctuations are not confined to agri-
culture sector, but extend to all economic activities, which explains the observed
persistence. This comes in line with the findings of Dell et al. (2012) showing
that higher temperature is negatively associated with industrial value added at the
national level, in contrast to the narrow view employed by weather-crime litera-
ture. The reason is that agriculture shocks can induce a demand-side shock to other
production sectors. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first local evidence
produced confirming the existence of spillovers effects between agriculture and non-
agriculture activities. Furthermore, results suggest that labor earnings and wages
are more likely to affect crime than employment, with the effect becoming stronger
in magnitude and significance for the agriculture and unskilled workers. This is an
improvement over the previous studies, by looking at the effect on labor income of
the hardest affected group—agriculture and unskilled labor— who are most likely
to commit crime rather examining the general economic conditions. This has the
implication that using weather shocks as an instrument for agriculture output (for
instance in Bignon et al., 2017) will fail to satisfy the exclusion restriction as re-
quired. Additionally, it suggests that earnings are more important indicator over
employment status, because the latter can remain unchanged if labor moved to
low-rank jobs, but earnings and wages will definitely be affected.
A number of points are worth mentioning. First, the non-availability of annual
data on employment, socio-economic conditions and public services limits the ability
to analyze how these variables respond over time. However, by considering only the
contemporaneous effect, it seems quite reasonable to conclude that earning and
wages are the predominant drivers. Second, the insignificant response of municipal
budgets and public services could be rather due to the fact that the municipal
budgets and especially local police forces are allocated at the state level, so their
corresponding effects can be absorbed by state-year specific effects. Third, despite
the finding that non-economic factors play a negligible role in driving the results in
contrast to other studies, it should be noted that using annual data can conceal a
lot of the effects that might appear with the use of shorter frequencies (i.e. daily,
weekly or monthly data). Yet, what I can argue that response of violent crimes to
non-economic factors (i.e. aggressive behavior or changing habits) is less persistent
over time and could be easily reversed on an aggregate level consistent with the
findings of Jacob et al. (2007).
Nevertheless, the results are very relevant in informing policy makers of future
consequences of global warming especially for agriculture-based economies. Poli-
cies aiming at mitigating the weather effects on agriculture yields and income are
highly desirable. One approach to reduce income fluctuations is through introduc-
ing insurance schemes against negative shocks and provision of safety nets covering
agriculture workers. This deemed an ex-post approach to mitigate negative con-
sequences of drought seasons on earnings and consumption. However, a long-run
strategy should involves the reduction of crop dependence on rainfall through in-
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stallment of new irrigation systems, or adoption of drought-tolerant crops varieties
(Mulwa and Visser, 2020). Another approach would be through farm diversification
by adoption of a mix of crop and livestock types that can reduce the risk of exposure
(Martin and Lorenzen, 2016).
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Variables definitions and sources
SPEI growing season is calculated by taking the average of SPEI monthly values
during the municipalities’ main crop growing season. The municipality’s main crop
is defined as the crop with the largest share of harvested area (measured in hectares)
in the greatest number of years. Data on municipality’s harvest area is taken from
IBGE - Municipal Agricultural Production Survey (Produção Agŕıcola Municipal –
PAM). The main crop is then matched to the start and end months of its growing
season identified primary from MIRCA 2000 crop calendars (Portmann, Siebert and
Döll, 2010) and secondary from FAO dataset crop calendar. Similarly, SPEI non-
growing season is the average of SPEI monthly values outside the municipalities’
main crop growing season.
Channels data.—Data on individual earnings, employment status, wages, poverty
and inequality is computed using Brazilian Demographic Census (Censo Demográfico)
for years 1991, 2000 and 2010. I also use census data to compute socio-demographic
and -economic variables such as share of agriculture workers, male, young and un-
skilled, average years of schooling and the fraction of workers in public safety related
jobs. Other socio-demographic municipal variables were already available at the Hu-
man Development Atlas in Brazil platform, namely the fraction of population living
in urban areas and illiteracy rates. Geographical variables describing the location
of municipalities (e.g. longitude, latitude, distance,. . . etc.) are taken from Instituto
de Investigación Económica Aplicada (IPEA).
Data on municipal revenues and expenses is retrieved from Brazil’s Ministry of
Finance’s National Treasury through Financas do Brazil (FINBRA) database. Agri-
culture gross output is taken from IBGE - Municipal Agricultural Production Sur-
vey (Produção Agŕıcola Municipal – PAM). Suicidal rates data is also obtained from
DATASUS (Depatamento de Informatica do Sistema Unico de Saude). All mone-
tary figures are expressed in real 2010 prices, with nominal figures deflated by CPI
index provided by IPEA (́Indice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor - INPC). The
poverty line is set by IPEA at 140 Brazilian Real (2010 prices). Table A1 contains
summary statistics of these variables.
Oil output.—Data on oil production comes from Agencia Nacional de Petroleo
(ANP), which provides information on oil output and oil fields locations on a
monthly basis. Following Ishak and Meon (2019), I use this data to determine mu-
nicipalities located over these oil fields and their production shares. International
oil prices are retrieved from International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2019).
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Table A1: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Channels
Agriculture gross output (value/hectare) 96,200 48.44 461.90 0 62,108.90
Night-time lights 84,304 2.03 3.33 0 58.13
Suicide rate (per 100,000) 96,200 5.27 8.99 0 160.94
Real earnings 11,544 596.37 346.17 52.70 2,773.92
Real agriculture earnings 11,544 478.86 377.50 33.89 7,941.22
Real earnings skilled 11,544 923.83 507.45 58.45 7,301.28
Real earnings unskilled 11,544 491.18 290.31 51.66 2,932.40
Real wages 11,544 3.53 2.04 0.33 22.68
Real agriculture wages 11,544 2.72 2.11 0.18 41.68
Real wages skilled 11,544 5.52 3.01 0.45 54.92
Real wages unskilled 11,544 2.90 1.74 0.29 28.06
Employment rate 11,544 0.62 0.09 0.22 0.94
Agriculture employment rate 11,544 0.46 0.17 0.01 0.92
Employment rate skilled 11,544 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.68
Employment rate unskilled 11,544 0.77 0.12 0.32 1.00
Unemployment rate 11,544 0.38 0.09 0.06 0.78
Poverty depth 11,544 67.67 19.32 13.72 118.12
GINI coefficient 11,544 0.52 0.07 0.28 0.92
Municipal expenses per capita 11,546 996.27 1,074.86 0.00 58,826.74
Municipal revenues per capita 11,546 781.00 847.99 0.00 58,545.35
Average years of schooling 11,544 3.64 1.23 0.37 7.25
Share of workers in public safety jobs 11,544 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
Controls
Illiteracy rate 11,544 27 15.44 1.76 84.19
Share of unskilled 11,544 0.50 0.05 0.27 0.73
Share of young (18 to 30 years old) 11,544 0.22 0.02 0.12 0.44
Share of male 11,544 0.51 0.01 0.46 0.81
Urbanization rate 11,544 0.53 0.20 0.02 1
Longtitude 11,544 -45.66 6.59 -72.90 -34.81
Latitude 11,544 -15.86 8.15 -33.52 3.88
Distance to capital state 11,544 254.78 161.97 0.00 1,476.28
Distance to federal state 11,544 1,087.74 445.86 69.24 2,867.95
Dummy for capital state 11,544 0 0.03 0 1
Dummy for coastal city 11,544 0.04 0.20 0 1
Note: The real values are based on 2010 prices.
Table A2: Correlations between homicide, robberies and physical assault rates
Homicides rate
Net of municipal Net of population, municipal
and state-year FE and state-year FE
Robberies rate 0.411*** 0.660***
Physical assault rate 0.186*** 0.254***
Note: Municipal level data on armed robberies and physical assault is for the states of Sao Paulo and Minas
Gerais from 2001 and 2013. Significantly different from zero at *10% significance, **5% significance level, ***1%
significance level.
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Table A3: Correlations between homicide and victimization rates
Homicides rate
Weighted by population
Attempted theft or robbery rate 0.410**
Theft or robbery rate 0.432**
Physical assault rate 0.350*
Note: State level data on the victimization rates is for the year 2009. Significantly different from zero at *10%
significance, **5% significance level, ***1% significance level.









Note: All unit root tests contain trend. For panel data, I apply the fisher type tests for Dickey-Fuller and Philipps-
Perron. I use 4 lags as indicated to be optimal by AIC criteria. Abbreviation: n.s., not significant at the 10% level.
Significantly different from zero at *10% significance, **5% significance level, ***1% significance level.




Bias-corrected Born and Breitung (2016) *** *** ***
Inoue and Solon (2006) *** *** ***
Heteroskedasticity-robust Born and Breitung (2016) *** - -
Note: The null hypothesis is no-serail autocorrelation up to order p, determined by the choosed lag.
Heteroskedasticity-robust Born and Breitung (2016) test has the null hypothesis of no first order serial correla-
tion. Significantly different from zero at *10% significance, **5% significance level, ***1% significance level.
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Appendix B
In this section I perform further robustness checks to the baseline estimates in Table
2, column 5. Table B1 contains the results for employing alternative specifications.
Column 1 drops all the SPEI temporal lags, while column 2 and 3 add additional
temporal lags up to 5 and 10 lags, respectively. Column 4 restrict the sample to
the 2000-2015 period to overcome the confounding effects of the trade liberalization
policy occurred during the early and mid-1990s, which is, as previously shown by
Dix-Carneiro et al. (2018), had caused a surge in criminal activities. Column 5
investigates the long-run relationship between weather shocks and criminal activ-
ities by taking the whole-period first difference. This is done to explore whether
weather effects on crime dissipates over time, for example due to better adaptation
of economies via technologies, or they persist by affecting the growth dynamics of
economic sectors. Columns 6 and 7 performs a placebo test by replacing SPEI by
its one-year forward value, and by its one-year, two-years and three-years forward
values, respectively. Throughout all the models, the estimated coefficients of con-
temporaneous SPEI remain the same in sign and significance, but their magnitudes
become larger when the sample period is restricted and when estimating the long-
run relationship. The sum of the coefficients of weathers shocks grow stronger in
magnitude with the addition of temporal lags. The latter two results confirms the
fact that weather shocks affect not only output levels but go beyond and affect
growth determinants such as product demand, investment and/or labor productiv-
ity consistent with the findings of Dell et al. (2012). Hence, the effects are not
easily reversed, but persist over time. Finally, the estimated coefficients of forward
SPEI are all statistically insignificant except for the third lag in column 7 which
is significant at the 10% level, but this most properly due to the drop in the sam-
ple size since the data on SPEI are only available until 2015. Nevertheless, tests
of joint significance of the estimated coefficients in column 7 fail to reject the null
hypothesis of no statistical significant difference between them. Column 8 clusters
the standard errors at the micro level, while column 9 adds the square SPEI terms
to further address non-linearities.
In the baseline results, I focused on crime rates per 100,000 inhabitants as the
primary measure for criminal activities following convention. In Table B2, I inquire
the robustness to alternative measures of crime and model estimations. In column
1, crime is measured as a count variable of the number of crimes occurred in a
given municipality unweighted by municipality’s population. To deal with outliers
especially intense crime rates representing around 1% of observations, I winsorize
these extreme values by replacing them with the next highest observation in column
2. This ensures that all observations are used and the effect of possibly spurious
outliers is reduced. To avoid sample selection bias aroused by dropping munici-
palities and/or observations with no crime data, I replace these missing data with
zero. However, this approach has resulted in inflating the sample with a number
of zero observations. To address that, I complement the approach in column 2 and
additionally winsorize the zero observations with their next lowest values in column
3. Furthermore, in column 4, all municipalities that have reported zero crime rates
throughout the whole sample period are dropped. This lead to a reduction in sam-
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ple size by 700 observations and an exclusion of 28 municipalities. In all cases, the
explanatory variable of interest, contemporaneous SPEI, remain robust in sign and
significance.
Table B3 contains additional robustness checks. Columns 1-3 use alternative dis-
tance cut-offs for computing standard errors. Column 4 drops oil-producing munici-
palities defined as all municipalities that has reported any oil production activity in
any year. Columns 4 and 5 employ a fixed-effects Poisson regression, a well-adapted
procedure to count variables and handles the zero-value observations. The downside
of Poisson regressions is that they do not converge in the presence of linear trends
or large number of fixed effects, which is a common feature in maximum-likelihood
estimation models. For this reason, state-year fixed effects is dropped in this spec-
ification and replaced by year-fixed effects. Finally, columns 7 and 8 exclude SPEI
values that 3 or 2 standard deviation higher (i.e. three-sigma and two-sigma out-
liers), respectively. Results show that increasing the distance cut-off of standard
errors at 500 and 1000 km distance have reduced the statistical significance of the
weather shocks variables since the average neighbor effect goes down with the ad-
dition of new neighbors. Dropping oil producing municipalities has no effect on the
estimates. The results from Poisson regression in column 5 show that coefficient
of contemporaneous SPEI stays negative and statistically significant. The second
lag is also significant, but carries a positive sign in contrast. The reverse in sign
could be rather due to the exclusion of state-year fixed effects, and hence, allowing
the time-varying unobserved heterogeneity occurring at the state level to remain
unchecked and introducing in turn biased estimates.1 Dropping the temporal lags
in column 6 do not affect the sign and significance of the contemporaneous coeffi-
cient. Finally, the estimates remain significant when excluding the three-sigma and
two-sigma outliers at the 5 and 10 percent significance level, respectively.
Table B4 checks the baseline results using alternative measures of weather shocks.
In column 1, I substitute the SPEI with indicators for (log) annual rainfall and av-
erage temperature. Data on rainfall and temperature are obtained from Climatic
Research Unit (CRU), University of East Anglia. Both rain and temperature are
included along with their one-year and two-year temporal lags. The estimated coef-
ficient of contemporaneous rain and its temporal lags are negative, but statistically
insignificant. Similarly, the coefficients of the temperature variables are also insignif-
icant, except for its second lag. Nevertheless, a simple equality test fails to reject
the null hypothesis of no statistical significant difference between the coefficients
of contemporaneous temperature and its second temporal lag (p-value=0.15). In
addition, the sum of coefficients of rain and temperature shocks are insignificant.
The reason for such insignificant effects might be explained by the inclusion of crime
spatial lags plus a wider battery of fixed effects at a finer level of data, which could
absorb most of the variation in rain and temperature.2 In contrast, SPEI controls
for the joint effects of temperature, precipitation and location, as well as their his-
torical values and thus, can withstand the inclusion of fixed effects without losing
1Note in the baseline estimations, we had 675 state × year fixed effects which are very demanding
from data and methodological perspectives.
2In unreported results, dropping the state-year fixed effects causes rain and temperature esti-
mated coefficient to gain significance.
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significance. Column 2 additionally adds rain and temperature shocks with SPEI
variables, and show no change in the baseline results.
Table B1: Violent crime and weather –Robustness checks
Dependent varibale: Homicide rate (per 100,000)






















SPEI, t -0.395** -0.405** -0.421** -0.784*** -3.176** -0.281 -0.029 -0.403* -0.346*
(0.199) (0.200) (0.200) (0.267) (1.279) (0.202) (0.197) (0.220) (0.205)
SPEI, t-1 -0.150 -0.163 -0.546** -0.290 -0.154 -0.141
(0.179) (0.179) (0.255) (0.187) (0.179) (0.184)
SPEI, t-2 -0.212 -0.223 -0.427 -0.380* -0.259 -0.244
(0.164) (0.165) (0.262) (0.195) (0.162) (0.166)
W(Violent crime) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Sum of coefficients -1.322** -1.871** -1.757*** -0.816** -0.732**
(0.467) (0.629) (0.508) (0.449) (0.364)
Joint significance test (p-value) 0.128
Number of observations 96,200 96,200 96,200 61,568 3,848 92,352 84,656 96,200 96,200
Number of municipalities 3848 3848 3848 3848 3,848 3,848 3848 3848 3848
Adjusted R-squared 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.096 0.168 0.115 0.093 0.175 0.1
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No No No Yes No No No No
The dependent variable is crime rate per 100,000 inhibitants. W is a spatial binary continguity matrix that assigns 1 to
muncipalties lying within 230 km distance cutoff. The method of estimation is ordinary least squares with Conley (1999)
standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within the indicated cutoff radius. Significantly
different from zero at *10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance.
Table B2: Violent crime and weather –Robustness checks
Dependent varibale: Homicide rate (per 100,000)











SPEI, t -0.202* -0.429** -0.427** -0.398**
(0.108) (0.185) (0.184) (0.200)
SPEI, t-1 -0.138 -0.169 -0.168 -0.153
(0.098) (0.167) (0.166) (0.180)
SPEI, t-2 -0.124 -0.231 -0.228 -0.257
(0.092) (0.156) (0.155) (0.166)
W(Violent Crime) 0.0001*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Sum of coefficients -0.464** -0.828** -0.823** -0.808**
(0.233) (0.325) (0.324) (0.355)
Number of observations 96,200 96,200 96,200 95,500
Number of municipalities 3,848 3,848 3,848 3,820
Adjusted R-squared 0.167 0.131 0.131 0.126
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No
The dependent variable in column 1 is number of crimes; in columns 2-5 is crime rate per 100,000 inhibitants. W is a
spatial binary continguity matrix that assigns 1 to muncipalties lying within 230 km distance cutoff. The method of
estimation is ordinary least squares with Conley (1999) standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for spatial
correlation within 230 km radius. Significantly different from zero at *10% significance, **5% significance, ***1%
significance.
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Table B3: Violent crime and weather –Robustness checks
Dependent varibale: Homicide rate (per 100,000)

















SPEI, t -0.399** -0.399* -0.399 -0.403** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.391** -0.373*
(0.188) (0.220) (0.243) (0.200) (0.007) (0.007) (0.200) (0.209)
SPEI, t-1 -0.155 -0.155 -0.155 -0.094 0.015** -0.157 -0.092
(0.170) (0.194) (0.213) (0.178) (0.007) (0.179) (0.183)
SPEI, t-2 -0.257 -0.257 -0.257 -0.205 0.006 -0.254 -0.184
(0.158) (0.180) (0.199) (0.164) (0.007) (0.165) (0.168)
W(Violent crime) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sum of SPEI coefficients -0.811** -0.811** -0.811** -0.701** -0.007 -0.802** -0.649*
(0.339) (0.374) (0.397) (0.351) (0.015) (0.353) (0.367)
Number of observations 96,200 96,200 96,200 93,650 95,500 95,500 96,176 90,946
Number of municipalities 3,848 3,848 3,848 3848 3,820 3,820 3848 3848
Adjusted R-squared 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.117 0.126 0.123
Log-likelihood ratio -621,664.12 -621,700.54
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variable is crime rate per 100,000 inhibitants. W is a spatial binary continguity matrix that assigns 1
to muncipalties lying within 230 km distance cutoff. The method of estimation is ordinary least squares with Conley
(1999) standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within 230 km radius. Significantly
different from zero at *10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance.
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Table B4: Violent crime and weather –Alternative weather shocks
(1) (2)





Rain (log), t -0.251 0.974
(0.697) (0.876)
Rain (log), t-1 0.128 0.931
(0.671) (0.850)
Rain (log), t-2 -0.695 0.092
(0.677) (0.876)
Temperature, t 0.044 -0.103
(0.771) (0.774)
Temperature, t-1 -0.740 -0.688
(0.775) (0.773)








W(Violent crime) 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Sum of coefficients (SPEI) -1.161**
(0.487)
Sum of coefficients (Rain) -0.819 -1.997
(1.338) (1.823)
Sum of coefficients (Temp) -2.178 -2.197
(1.362) (1.362)
Number of observations 96,200 96,200
Number of municipalities 3,848 3,848
Adjusted R-squared 0.128 0.128
Population density Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes
The dependent variable is crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants. W is a spatial binary contiguity matrix that
assigns 1 to municipalities lying within 230 km distance cutoff. The method of estimation is ordinary least
squares with Conley (1999) standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within 230
km radius. Significantly different from zero at *10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance.
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Appendix C
C.1 Non-Linear Effects of Weather Shocks
So far, it was assumed that the response of violent crime rates to weather fluctuations
is linear. I relax this assumption and estimate instead an extended non-parametric
model with different bins for SPEI based on the decile values of SPEI. Each bin is
an indicator for the values belonging to the first eight deciles. The omitted category
corresponds to the nineth decile (i.e. highest levels of SPEI). Figure C1 plots the
estimated response of crime rates to each of the eight SPEI bins along with 90%
confidence interval. The estimated coefficients are relatively larger in magnitude
and stronger in significance for the first three bins (i.e. values below -0.05 units)
indicating the effect of SPEI on violent crime rates is greater for the negative SPEI
values corresponding to drought seasons relative to the higher positive SPEI values.
The magnitudes of the effects are quite large as well, for instance, one-standard
deviation decrease in SPEI below -0.05 units (relative to a range of 0.86 and more)
will increase crime by 58%-86%, which is more than double the effect of the baseline
estimates (34%).
Notes: This Figure reports coefficient estimates for the deciles of the SPEI (bin 9 –highest values-
is the reference) along with the 90% of confidence interval. Bins 1-3 contains the negative values
of SPEI.
Figure C1: Non-linear effects of SPEI
C.2 Rural vs. urban areas
Following the conceptual framework, the effects of weather are expected to hit harder
the rural areas where the agriculture sector is the primary economic activity and the
main source of income. Similarly, the spillovers to other non-agriculture sectors are
expected to be stronger. Results already show that the earnings of agriculture and
unskilled workers are the most affected by weather shocks underlying the dominance
of income mechanism. Another strategy to investigate this mechanism is to re-
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estimate the effect of weather fluctuations on violent crime rates on sub-samples
split by municipality rural characteristics, in which agriculture sector is regarded
as the primary economic activity (Siqueira and Osorio, 2001).3 To capture that,
I use the cultivated area of main crop per capita (hectare/capita) to measure the
scope of agriculture activities. The larger the size of the cultivated area, the more
workers are needed to harvest the main crop, hence more households are dependent
on agriculture income.
Figure C2 plots the estimated coefficients for each sub-sample split based on
cultivated land per capita in 1991 along with the 90% of confidence interval. The
x-axis defines the cutoff points splitting the sample ranging from 0 area to over 0.65
units, so that municipalities are excluded with respect to increasing values of this
share. The results show more clearly that municipalities with a relatively larger
share of cultivated land experience more crime rates following weather shocks. The
point estimates depict an increase in absolute magnitude of the effect with the rise
in the cultivated area until 0.40 cutoff. Afterwards, they decline in magnitude and
become imprecisely estimated beyond the 0.55 cutoff due to the significant decline











Main crop cultivated area (hectare/capita)0 0.65+
Notes: This Figure reports coefficient estimates for each sub-sample split based on main crop’s
cultivated area per capita (hectare/capita) in 1991 along with the 90% of confidence interval.
The municipalities are sequentially excluded based on the increasing share of agriculture workers.
The x-axis defines the cutoff points splitting the sample ranging from almost 0 cultivated area to
over 0.65 hectare per capita.
Figure C2: Split by main crop’s cultivated area per capita
3See L.G. Scorzafave et al. (2015) for more information on the different criteria for defining
rural Brazil.
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